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Why	  all	  anthropology	  should	  be	  called	  
techno-­‐anthropology	  	  






This	  chapter	  argues	  that	  if	  we	  follow	  a	  pragmatist	  understanding	  of	  humans	  and	  technologies,	  
there	   is	   no	   reason	   to	   keep	   these	   phenomena	   strongly	   separated.	   The	   suggestion	   that	   all	  
anthropology	   should	   be	   called	   techno-­‐anthropology	  might	   provoke	   some	   readers,	   but	   it	   is	  
first	  and	  foremost	   intended	  as	  an	  invitation	  to	  think	  in	  ambitious	  terms	  about	  what	  techno-­‐
anthropology	  might	   be(come).	   The	  main	   contribution	   of	   the	   chapter	   is	   to	   introduce	   Bruno	  
Latour	   and	   John	  Dewey	   as	   techno-­‐anthropologists.	  While	   these	   two	   thinkers	   are	   known	   for	  
many	   other	   engagements,	   and	   wrote	   in	   different	   times,	   they	   share	   a	   pragmatist	  
understanding	  of	  humans	  as	  fundamentally	  entangled	  in	  their	  technologies.	  Such	  a	  standpoint	  
may	  sound	  trivial,	  but	  a	  lot	  of	  effort	  still	  goes	  into	  separating	  humans	  and	  technologies,	  both	  
as	  a	  philosophical	  argument	  and	  as	  a	  critique	  of	  contemporary	  life.	  The	  chapter	  starts	  with	  an	  
example	  of	   such	  efforts,	  namely	  Sherry	  Turkle’s	   recent	  work	  on	   care	   robots	  and	  other	  new	  
technologies	  that	  mediate	  human	  relationships.	  I	  move	  on	  to	  suggest	  that	  with	  Latour’s	  notion	  
of	  delegation,	  such	  mediation	  appears	  less	  alien.	  In	  order	  to	  develop	  further	  the	  consequences	  
of	   Latour’s	   techno-­‐anthropologist	  moves,	   I	   turn	   to	  Dewey’s	   understanding	   of	   technology	   as	  
inquiry,	   a	   concept	   that	   deliberately	   ignores	   the	   physical/psychological	   dichotomy.	   The	  
chapter	   concludes	   with	   a	   couple	   of	   empirical	   examples	   of	   how	   the	   pragmatist	   perspective	  
might	  guide	  techno-­‐anthropological	  analysis.	  
	  
Introduction:	  Keeping	  things	  separate	  	  
The	   book	   to	   which	   this	   text	   seeks	   to	   contribute	   asks	   the	   question:	   What	   is	   techno-­‐
anthropology?	  Now,	  one	  way	  to	  start	  defining	  techno-­‐anthropology	  is	  to	  outline	  what	  kind	  of	  
answers	   might	   be	   provided	   by	   a	   techno-­‐anthropological	   approach	   to	   things.	   While	   good	  
answers	   are	   no	   doubt	   important,	   they	   are,	   however,	   also	   notoriously	   difficult	   to	   come	   by.	  
Often	  a	  more	  useful	  place	  to	  start	  is	  by	  posing	  good	  questions.	  What	  questions	  might	  we	  ask	  
with	  the	  help	  of	  techno-­‐anthropology?	  As	  any	  rigorous	  English	  dictionary	  is	  happy	  to	  remind	  
us,	   ’technology’	   derives	   from	   a	   combination	   of	   the	   Greek	   words	   tekhne	   and	   logia.	   While	  
tekhne	   might	   be	   understood	   as	   art	   or	   craft,	   logia	   refers	   to	   systematic	   treatment,	   which	  
together	  results	   in	  something	   like	   ’the	  systematic	   treatment	  of	  craft’.	  The	  second	  half	  of	   the	  
new	   concept	   is	   ’anthropology’,	   which	   derives	   from	   the	   Greek	   ’anthropos’,	   meaning	   human	  
being.	  Together	  with	  logia	  this	  second	  part	  then	  becomes	  ’the	  systematic	  treatment	  of	  human	  
beings’.	   In	  combination,	   the	  notions	  of	  technology	  and	  anthropology	  put	  together	   in	  techno-­‐
anthropology	   might	   thus	   be	   taken	   to	   mean	   ’the	   systematic	   treatment	   of	   the	   relationship	  
between	  craft	  and	  human	  beings’.	  At	  least	  if	  we	  assume	  that	  the	  hyphen	  means	  something	  like	  
relationship	  (on	  this	  relationship,	  see	  also	  Børsen,	  this	  volume,	  and	  Botin,	  this	  volume).	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What	  phenomena	  might	  be	  investigated	  with	  such	  a	  focus	  on	  techno-­‐anthropology?	  One	  clear-­‐
cut	  example	  of	   intertwinement	  between	  human	  beings	  and	  crafted	  technologies,	   it	  might	  be	  
argued,	   are	   human-­‐like	   robots	   (Birkholm,	   this	   volume).	   In	   a	   recent	   and	   widely	   discussed	  
book,	   an	   MIT	   professor	   of	   social	   studies	   of	   science	   and	   technology,	   Sherry	   Turkle	   (2011),	  
suggests	  one	  way	  to	  pose	  what	  could	  easily	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  important	  techno-­‐anthropological	  
question:	  Do	  robots	  pose	  a	  fundamental	  challenge	  to	  our	  humanity?	  The	  argument	  that	  Turkle	  
makes	   in	  Alone	  Together	  –	  Why	  we	  expect	  more	   from	  technology	  and	   less	   from	  each	  other	   is	  
that	   yes,	   robots	   are	   a	  pivotal	   example	  of	   the	  kinds	  of	   technological	   fixes	   that	  makes	  us	   shy	  
away	  from	  the	  fragile	  and	  complex	  stuff	  that	  human	  beings	  are.	  Why	  bother	  interacting	  with	  
other	   people	   if	   we	   can	   replace	   them	   by	   robots	   that	   are	   much	   more	   stable	   and	   much	   less	  
demanding?	  Turkle’s	   concern,	  perhaps	  already	  obvious,	   is	   that	   the	  convenient	  mediation	  or	  
even	   replacement	   of	   humans	   by	   technology	   results	   in	   more	   shallow	   relationships,	   which	  
makes	  it	  possible	  to	  imagine	  a	  world	  were	  we	  feel	  alone	  despite	  being	  immersed	  in	  a	  wealth	  
of	  interaction	  with	  and	  through	  technology.	  	  	  
	  
Turkle’s	  argument	  is	  a	  powerful	  one,	  something	  that	  the	  views	  count	  of	  her	  online	  TED	  talk	  is	  
testament	  to.	  As	  of	  April	  2013,	  more	  than	  1.6	  million	  visitors	  have	  watched	  Turkle	  pitch	  her	  
argument	  in	  a	  20-­‐minute	  online	  video	  on	  TED.com	  (Turkle	  2012).	  One	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  the	  
argument	   is	   so	   powerful	   is	   probably	   that	   it	   develops	   a	   well-­‐known	   tension	   between	  
something	   familiar	   and	   something	   ’other’.	   Most	   of	   us	   appreciate	   that	   strong	   human	  
relationships	  are	  key	   to	  a	  good	   life,	   and	   if	  new	   technologies,	   such	  as	  apparently	   convenient	  
human-­‐like	   robots,	   are	   about	   to	  be	   sneaked	   in	   like	   a	  Trojan	  horse	   to	   threaten	  human	  well-­‐
being,	  we	  would	   like	   to	  hear	  more	   about	   it.	  However,	   the	  power	  of	  Turkle’s	   argument	   also	  
gives	  all	  the	  more	  reason	  to	  pause	  and	  think	  carefully	  about	  what	  assumptions	  about	  human	  
beings	  and	  technology	  the	  argument	  rests	  on.	  	  
	  
As	  one	  reviewer	  of	  Turkle’s	  book	  points	  out	  (Lipman	  2013),	  Alone	  Together	  is	  about	  carving	  
out	  space	  for	  the	  conclusion	  that	  we	  should	  ”put	  [technology]	  in	  its	  place”	  (Turkle	  2011:295).	  
The	   conclusion	   illustrates	   that	  Turkle	   is	  no	   luddite,	  who	   simply	  wants	   to	   return	   to	   a	  world	  
without	   technology,	   but	   rather	   a	   champion	   of	   the	   idea	   that	   there	   is	   a	   place	   for	   advanced	  
technology	  in	  the	  world,	  just	  not	  in	  the	  warmth	  of	  human	  relationships.	  But	  what	  if	  the	  ’place’	  
of	  technology	  is	  right	  there	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  human	  relationships?	  Thinkers	  like	  Bruno	  Latour	  
and	  John	  Dewey	  have	  offered	  persuasive	  accounts	  of	  technology	  that	  reject	  a	  divide	  between	  
something	   genuinely	   ’human’	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   ’other’	   of	   technology.	   They	   both	   do	   so	   on	  
pragmatist	   grounds,	   by	   which	   I	   mean	   that	   they	   reject	   the	   usefulness	   of	   maintaining	   any	   a	  
priori	   theoretical	   classifications	   of	   their	   objects	   of	   study.	   Instead,	   they	   argue	   that	   all	  
knowledge	  production	  must	  start	  with	  what	  has	  consequence	  in	  practice	  –	  a	  kind	  of	  pragmatic	  
realism.	  Studying	  concrete	  practices	  and	  their	  consequences,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  uphold	  the	  idea	  that	  
technology	  neither	  could	  nor	  should	  be	  kept	  out	  of	  human	  relationships.	  	  
	  
The	   philosophical	   tradition	   of	   pragmatism,	   in	   which	   Dewey	   is	   one	   of	   the	   most	   prominent	  
members,	   is	  a	   long	  and	  rich	  one	  that	  I	  can	  only	  recommend	  that	  the	  reader	  explore	  further.	  
The	  question	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  pragmatist	  tradition	  and	  the	  more	  recent	  strand	  
of	  research	  within	  actor-­‐network	  theory	  (ANT)	  and	  science	  and	  technology	  studies	  (STS),	   in	  
which	  Latour	  is	  a	  central	  figure,	  is	  an	  interesting	  topic	  that	  it	  requires	  a	  different	  paper	  to	  deal	  
with.	  My	   ambition	   here	   is	  merely	   to	   develop	   further	   the	   pragmatist	   line	   of	   thinking	   about	  
technology	  introduced	  above,	  and	  try	  to	  show	  how	  the	  thoughts	  of	  Latour	  and	  Dewey	  can	  be	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useful	   resources	   for	   techno-­‐anthropology	   –	   not	   least	   for	   problematizing	   arguments	   like	  
Turkle’s	  and	  thus	  making	  techno-­‐anthropology	  relevant	  to	  contemporary	  debates.	  
	  
Latour:	  What	  makes	  us	  human	  is	  our	  delegation	  of	  effort	  to	  nonhumans	  
Despite	  being	  widely	  cited,	  Bruno	  Latour	  can	  be	  surprisingly	  hard	  to	  pin	  down.	  For	  many,	  his	  
earliest	   work	   continues	   to	   be	   his	   most	   famous	   contribution,	   especially	   the	   ethnographic	  
studies	   of	   scientists	   at	   work	   in	   Laboratory	   Life:	   The	   Social	   Construction	   of	   Scientific	   Facts	  
(Latour	   and	   Woolgar	   1979).	   The	   subtitle	   certainly	   could	   be	   taken	   as	   an	   invitation	   to	  
understand	  Latour	  as	  another	  social	  constructivist,	  but	  the	  authors	  in	  fact	  removed	  the	  word	  
’social’	  from	  the	  title	  in	  a	  later	  version	  of	  the	  book	  to	  discourage	  such	  as	  reading	  (Latour	  and	  
Woolgar	  1986).	  Indeed,	  when	  seen	  from	  the	  discipline	  of	  sociology,	  Latour	  seems	  to	  take	  on	  
the	  opposite	  guise.	  In	  another	  widely	  read	  book,	  Reassembling	  the	  Social	  –	  An	  Introduction	  to	  
Actor-­‐Network	   Theory,	   Latour	   (2005)	   argues	   that	   sociologists	   tend	   to	   vest	   too	   much	  
explanatory	   power	   in	   ’the	   social’	   and	   ignore	   what	   he	   has	   previously	   called	   the	   ’missing	  
masses’	   of	   the	  many	   objects	   we	   are	   surrounded	   by	   (Latour	   1992).	   Given	   these	   apparently	  
contradictory	  arguments	  –	  too	  little	  ’social’	  versus	  too	  much	  –	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  if	  there	  is	  
any	  coherence	  in	  Latour’s	  work,	  his	  ambition	  cannot	  be	  to	  either	  explain	  away	  the	  human	  or	  
the	  nonhuman	   side	  of	   things.	   Indeed,	   the	   self-­‐contradiction	   is	   only	   apparent,	   since	  Latour’s	  
project	   is	   exactly	   to	   avoid	   getting	   caught	   up	   in	   what	   he	   sees	   as	   an	   unproductive	   and	  
unrealistic	   dichotomy	   between	   social	   and	   non-­‐social	   entities,	   or	   simply	   humans	   and	  
technologies,	  to	  use	  the	  terms	  of	  techno-­‐anthropology.	  
	  
Whether	   Latour	   succeeds	   in	   his	   project	   is	   of	   course	   another	   question.	   The	   focus	   here,	  
however,	   is	   to	  discuss	  what	  Latour	  has	   to	  offer	  as	  a	   techno-­‐anthropologist.	   In	  pursuing	   this	  
task	  it	  might	  prove	  worthwhile	  to	  look	  beyond	  the	  famous	  books	  mentioned	  above,	  down	  at	  
the	   undercurrent	   of	   shorter	   articles	   that	   Latour	   has	   also	   published	   over	   the	   last	   three	  
decades.	  More	  specifically,	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  section	  will	  suggest	  how	  two	  of	  Latour’s	  articles	  can	  
serve	   as	   useful	   entry	   points	   to	   his	   techno-­‐anthropology.	   The	   point	   is	   to	   extract	   arguments	  
from	  Latour’s	  work	  that	  underpins	  the	  main	  thesis	  of	  this	  chapter	  –	  that	  being	  human	  means	  
being	  techno-­‐human.	  
	  
In	  an	  article	  called	  On	  Interobjectivity,	  Latour	  (1996)	  asks	  the	  question	  of	  what	  defines	  us	  as	  
humans,	   which	   also	   means	   that	   he	   sketches	   his	   own	   anthropology.	   As	   always,	   defining	  
something	  requires	  making	  a	  difference,	  and	  in	  this	  case	  Latour	  draws	  a	  line	  between	  animals	  
and	   humans.	   The	   assumption,	   Latour	   argues,	   on	   which	   traditional	   sociology	   has	   based	   its	  
exclusive	   focus	   on	   humans	   is	   that	   humans	   exhibit	   an	   extraordinary	   ’sociality’,	   or	   social	  
complexity.	  While	   animals	  may	   engage	   in	   frequent	   interaction,	   such	   events	   come	   nowhere	  
near	   the	   richness	   of	   the	   social	   interaction	   between	   humans	   that	   is	   the	   object	   of	   sociology.	  
Latour,	  however,	  makes	  the	  case	  that	  this	  assumption	  no	  longer	  holds.	  Recent	  research	  within	  
sociobiology,	  on	  which	  Latour	  has	  written	  together	  with	  the	  biologist	  Shirley	  Strum	  (Latour	  
and	  Strum	  1986;	  Strum	  and	  Latour	  1987)	  demonstrates	  how	  monkeys	   lead	  highly	   complex	  
social	   lives.	   In	  order	   to	  understand	   this,	   ”one	  must	  have	  seen	  a	   troop	  of	  some	  100	  baboons	  
living	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  savannah,	  looking	  incessantly	  at	  each	  other	  so	  as	  to	  know	  where	  the	  
troop	   is	   going,	   who	   is	   with	  whom,	  who	   is	   grooming	  whom,	  who	   is	   attacking	   or	   defending	  
whom”	  (Latour	  1996:231).	  In	  order	  to	  interact	  successfully,	  any	  baboon	  has	  to	  constantly	  test	  
its	   dominance	   and	   membership	   relationships,	   the	   result	   of	   which	   is	   a	   level	   of	   social	  
complexity	  that	  can	  easily	  compare	  with	  that	  of	  humans.	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Given	  the	  discovery	  that	  humans	  are	  not	  made	  exceptional	  by	  the	  complexity	  of	   their	  social	  
interaction,	   Latour	   then	   asks	   what	   else	   might	   explain	   the	   obvious	   differences	   between	  
humans	  and	  animals.	  His	   lead	   in	  answering	   this	  question	   is	   the	  observation	   that	  humans	   in	  
fact	  do	  not	  have	  to	  constantly	  test	  their	  social	  relationships	  with	  other	  humans	  in	  order	  to	  act	  
in	   meaningful	   ways.	   In	   order	   to	   describe	   this	   difference,	   Latour	   introduces	   a	   distinction	  
between	  the	  complex	   social	   life	  of	  baboons	  (and	  many	  other	  primates),	  and	  the	  complicated	  
social	  life	  of	  humans.	  The	  notion	  of	  human	  interaction	  as	  complicated	  is	  supposed	  to	  describe	  
how	  humans	  do	  not	  have	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  full	  complexity	  of	  their	  social	  worlds	  all	   the	  time,	  
because	  our	  interactions	  are	  framed	  by	  the	  massive	  amount	  of	  objects	  and	  technologies	  that	  
we	  use	  all	   the	   time.	  Latour	   thus	   finds	  another	  answer	   to	   the	  question	  of	  what	  distinguishes	  
humans	  from	  other	  primates:	  It	  is	  our	  use	  of	  things	  rather	  than	  the	  level	  of	  complexity	  in	  our	  
social	   interactions.	   Our	   use	   of	   things	   makes	   it	   possible	   to	   structure	   interactions,	   as	   when	  
complicated	  infrastructures	  such	  as	  traffic	  lights	  make	  it	  possible	  for	  a	  lot	  of	  humans	  in	  cars	  to	  
coexist,	  because	  they	  do	  not	  have	  to	  watch	  all	  other	  cars	  all	  the	  time	  in	  order	  to	  survive	  the	  
rush	   hour.	   In	   Latour’s	   language,	   technologies	   like	   traffic	   lights	   shifts	   human	   life	   from	  
requiring	  constant	  attention	  in	  complex	  settings	  to	  requiring	  complicated	  infrastructures.	  
	  
Here,	  one	  starts	  to	  glimpse	  the	  contours	  of	  an	  understanding	  of	  humans	  that	  is	  fundamentally	  
techno-­‐anthropological.	   Latour	   argues	   that	   the	   primary	   quality	   that	   distinguishes	   humans	  
from	   animals	   is	   the	   use	   of	   technologies.	   Again,	   this	  might	   be	   easy	   to	   accept	   at	   first,	   but	   an	  
interesting	  consequence	  that	  Latour	  suggests	  in	  his	  article	  is	  that	  it	  becomes	  difficult	  to	  refer	  
to	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  relationships	  as	  particularly	  genuine,	  in	  the	  way	  Sherry	  Turkle	  does.	  Here	  it	  is	  
worth	  quoting	  Latour	  at	  length:	  
	  
”We	  say,	  without	  giving	  the	  matter	  too	  much	  thought,	  that	  we	  engage	  in	  ”face-­‐to-­‐
face”	   interactions.	   Indeed	   we	   do,	   but	   the	   clothing	   that	   we	   are	   wearing	   comes	  
from	  elsewhere	  and	  was	  manufactured	  a	  long	  time	  ago;	  the	  words	  we	  use	  were	  
not	  formed	  for	  this	  occasion;	  the	  walls	  we	  have	  been	  leaning	  on	  were	  designed	  by	  
an	   architect	   for	   a	   client,	   and	   constructed	   by	  workers	   –	   people	  who	   are	   absent	  
today,	  although	  their	  action	  continues	  to	  make	  itself	  felt.	  The	  very	  person	  we	  are	  
addressing	   is	  a	  product	  of	  a	  history	   that	  goes	   far	  beyond	  the	   framework	  of	  our	  
relationship”	  (Latour	  1996:231)	  
	  
In	  this	  quote,	  the	  special	  virtue	  of	  direct	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  interaction	  between	  human	  beings	  that	  
Turkle	  upheaves	  to	  a	  kind	  of	  ’gold	  standard’	  falls	  apart.	  Human	  interaction	  is	  always	  mediated	  
by	   something,	   be	   it	   social	  media,	   a	   robot	   baby	   seal,	   or	   simply	   the	   clothes	  we	   are	  wearing.	  
Drawing	  on	  Latour	  it	  becomes	  possible	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  specific	  qualities	  of	  different	  kinds	  of	  
mediation	   instead	   of	   comparing	  mediating	   technologies	  with	   an	   imagined	   gold	   standard	   of	  
non-­‐mediated	  ’genuine’	  relationships.	  This	  is	  Latour’s	  techno-­‐anthropological	  move.	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  develop	  a	  bit	  further	  what	  such	  a	  move	  might	  mean,	  I	  now	  turn	  to	  a	  second	  article	  
called	  Where	  are	  the	  missing	  masses?	  The	  sociology	  of	  a	  few	  mundane	  artifacts	  (Latour	  1992).	  
In	  this	  text	  Latour	   introduces	  the	  concept	  of	  delegation	  to	  describe	  the	  transformation	  of	  ”a	  
major	  effort	  into	  a	  minor	  one”	  (Ibid.:154).	  It	  is	  precisely	  this	  transformation	  of	  effort	  that	  is	  at	  
stake	  when	  humans	  use	  technologies,	  as	  also	  pointed	  out	  above.	  The	  strength	  of	  this	  second	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text	  is	  that	  it	  offers	  a	  range	  of	  useful	  examples,	  some	  of	  which	  are	  surprisingly	  simple.	  I	  will	  
mention	  two	  of	  them	  here,	  the	  door	  and	  the	  seatbelt.	  
	  
The	  example	  of	  a	  door	  is	  useful	  for	  demonstrating	  the	  immense	  work	  done	  by	  technologies	  in	  
order	   to	  make	  human	   interaction	  possible.	   In	  other	  words,	   it	   illustrates	  our	  dependency	  on	  
nonhumans	   in	   order	   to	   exist	   as	   humans.	   As	   argued	   in	   the	   quote	   above,	   face-­‐to-­‐face	  
interactions	   are	   often	   framed	   by	  walls.	   These	  walls	   were	   designed	   and	   built	   by	   people	   no	  
longer	   present	   in	   the	   situation,	   which	   undermines	   the	   standpoint	   that	   face-­‐to-­‐face	  
relationships	   are	   more	   genuinely	   ’situated’	   or	   ’local’	   than,	   say,	   email	   interaction.	   Another	  
feature	  of	  walls	  is	  that	  they	  cut	  off	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world,	  which	  is	  highly	  useful	  for	  making	  it	  
possible	   to	   focus	   on	   the	   social	   interaction	   going	   on	   inside	   the	   walls.	   The	   inconvenience,	  
however,	   is	   that	   the	   framed	   situation	   is	   hard	   to	   obtain:	   You	   have	   to	   build	   a	   wall,	   which	  
requires	  bricks,	   cement,	   tools,	  not	   to	  mention	  a	  certain	  strength,	  persistence	  and	  ability.	  To	  
make	  matters	  even	  worse,	  you	  have	  to	  break	  down	  the	  wall	  again	  if	  you	  want	  to	  get	  out	  of	  the	  
specific	  social	  interaction	  that	  took	  place	  in	  your	  newly	  built	  framework.	  This	  is	  what	  Latour	  
calls	  the	  ”wall-­‐hole	  dilemma”	  (Latour	  1992:155).	  	  
	  
On	   the	   backdrop	   of	   this	   tiresome	   masoner’s	   dilemma,	   it	   becomes	   possible	   to	   more	   fully	  
appreciate	   the	   virtue	   of	   doors,	  with	   their	   hinges,	   handles,	   and	  man-­‐sizedness.	   By	   placing	   a	  
door	  in	  a	  wall	  it	  becomes	  possible	  to	  avoid	  doing	  the	  work	  of	  destroying	  and	  rebuilding	  walls	  
over	  and	  over	  again	  in	  order	  to	  benefit	  from	  their	  ability	  to	  frame	  social	  interaction.	  Instead,	  
these	  walled	  spaces	  can	  be	  reused	  almost	  infinitely	  as	   ’rooms’	  that	  simplify	  the	  world	  for	  us	  
when	  we	  need	  it,	  something	  that	  billions	  of	  humans	  benefit	  from	  every	  day	  in	  order	  to	  coexist.	  
The	  major	  effort	  of	  constantly	  breaking	  down	  and	  reconstructing	  walls	  has	  been	  transformed	  
into	  the	  minor	  effort	  of	  operating	  door	  handles	  by	  delegating	  the	  task	  of	  solving	  the	  wall-­‐hole	  
dilemma	  to	  the	  technology	  called	  doors.	  
	  
If	  this	  first	  example	  of	  a	  door	  made	  it	  sound	  more	  plausible	  that	  our	  use	  of	  technologies	  is	  a	  
premise	   for	   our	   very	   existence	   as	   human	   beings,	   one	   might	   still	   raise	   the	   objection	   that	  
another	  important	  dichotomy	  exists,	  namely	  between	  the	  ability	  of	  a	  human	  to	  have	  feelings	  
and	  act	  morally,	  and	  a	  door’s	  apparent	  lack	  of	  those	  qualities.	  Using	  the	  example	  of	  a	  seat	  belt,	  
however,	  Latour	  rejects	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case.	  The	  seat	  belt	  has	  features	  similar	  to	  the	  door,	  we	  
might	   note,	   because	   it	  makes	   it	   possible	   to	   simultaneously	   be	   tied	   down	   and	   able	   to	  move	  
around	  enough	  to	  operate	  a	  car.	  A	  door	  exhibits	  a	  similar	  flexibility	  by	  making	  it	  possible	  to	  
choose	  between	  being	  shut	  off	   from	  the	  world	  and	  exit	   into	   the	  world.	  The	  seat	  belt	  has	  an	  
additional	  feature	  in	  some	  cars,	  however,	  which	  is	  that	  it	  has	  to	  be	  fastened	  in	  order	  for	  the	  
engine	   to	   start.	   In	   other	   cars	   an	   annoying	   beep	   tone	   continues	   until	   the	   belt	   is	   fastened.	  
According	  to	  Latour	  this	  demonstrates	  that	  technologies,	  too,	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  be	  moral	  in	  
the	  sense	  that	   if	  a	  driver	  decides	  to	  perform	  the	  immoral	  (but	  perhaps	  emancipating)	  act	  of	  
driving	  with	  the	  belt	  unfastened,	  he	  or	  she	  is	  prevented	  from	  doing	  so.	  The	  enforcement	  of	  the	  
moral	   dictum	   ”don’t	   kill	   yourself”	   has	   been	   delegated	   to	   the	   technology	   called	   seat	   belts	  
(Latour	  1992:168).	  
	  
It	  is	  such	  complicated	  mechanisms	  that	  imbue	  technologies	  like	  seat	  belts	  with	  the	  power	  to	  
be	   moral	   despite	   being	   non-­‐human.	   This	   does	   not	   only	   apply	   to	   seat	   belts,	   but	   to	   many	  
technologies.	   If	   one	   adds	   the	  mechanism	   of	   a	   lock	   to	   a	   door,	   it	  will	   be	   possible	   to	   think	   of	  
several	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  door	  may	  act	  morally	  by	  preventing	  humans	  from	  acting	  immorally.	  
Birkbak, A. (2013). Why all anthropology should be called techno-anthropology: On the consequences of a 
pragmatist understanding of technology. In T. Børsen, & L. Botin (eds.), What is Techno-
Anthropology?. Aalborg: Aalborg Universitetsforlag. (Series in Transformational Studies; No. 1, Vol. 2). 
	  	  
	   6	  
The	   ability	   to	   act	   morally,	   which	   common	   sense	   might	   call	   ’deeply	   human’,	   is	   in	   practice	  
deeply	  entangled	  with	  the	  non-­‐human	  technologies	  that	  co-­‐define	  who	  we	  are.	  
	  
Dewey:	  Technology	  as	  inquiry	  
In	  the	  next	  part	  of	  the	  chapter	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  latourian	  anthropology	  of	  humans	  as	  defined	  
by	  their	  delegation	  of	  effort	  to	  technology	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  informed	  by	  pragmatist	  philosophy.	  
For	  this	  reason,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  look	  to	  one	  of	  the	  most	  prominent	  pragmatists,	  John	  Dewey,	  in	  
order	  to	  develop	  further	  why	  all	  anthropology	  should	  be	  called	  techno-­‐anthropology.	  Despite	  
the	  longer	  history	  of	  reception	  allowed	  by	  Dewey	  living	  his	  life	  almost	  a	  century	  earlier	  than	  
Latour,	  Dewey’s	  work	  continues	  to	  resemble	  a	  labyrinth,	  difficult	  to	  navigate,	  not	  least	  due	  to	  	  
the	   sheer	   size	  of	  his	   intellectual	  production.	   In	   the	   following,	   I	   use	  Larry	  Hickman’s	   (1990)	  
recent	   work	   in	   a	   volume	   called	   John	   Dewey’s	   Pragmatic	   Technology	   as	   the	   main	   guide	   for	  
tracing	  Dewey’s	  understanding	  of	  technology	  through	  his	  works.	  
	  
In	  order	   to	  appreciate	  what	  makes	  Dewey’s	   thought	  pragmatic,	  however,	   it	   is	  useful	   to	   first	  
mention	   one	   of	   his	   shorter	   books,	   The	   Public	   and	   its	   Problems	   (1927),	   in	   the	   beginning	   of	  
which	   Dewey	   makes	   a	   few	   central	   arguments.	   First	   and	   foremost,	   Dewey’s	   pragmatism	  
consists	  of	  understanding	  phenomena	  by	  looking	  at	  their	  consequences,	  rather	  than	  designing	  
a	  priori	  theories	  with	  which	  to	  conceptualize	  them.	  An	  instructive,	  and	  perhaps	  even	  radical,	  
example	  is	  Dewey’s	  rejection	  of	  the	  distinction	  between	  individual	  and	  society.	  For	  Dewey,	  all	  
actions	  originate	  in	  some	  specific	  individual,	  so	  it	  does	  not	  make	  sense	  to	  distinguish	  between	  
two	  kinds	  of	  explanation	  in	  the	  form	  of	  individual	  and	  society,	  as	  so	  often	  done	  in	  the	  social	  
sciences.	  Moreover,	  according	  to	  Dewey	  there	  is	  no	  situation	  in	  which	  an	  individual	  can	  exist	  
without	  always	  already	  being	  defined	  by	  its	  associations	  with	  other	  people	  and	  other	  things,	  
so	  ’society’	  is	  always	  there,	  making	  the	  distinction	  between	  individual	  and	  society	  disposable	  
in	  a	  second	  sense.	  Latour	   (1986)	  makes	  a	  similar	  argument	  when	  he	  recommends	  avoiding	  
making	   any	   a	   priori	   distinctions	   between	   the	   ’sizes’	   of	   actors.	   In	   short,	   Latour	   and	   Dewey	  
share	  the	  pragmatist	  insight	  that	  a	  priori	  categories	  have	  limited	  usefulness	  for	  understanding	  
the	  world.	  
	  
Following	   this	   devaluation	   of	   abstract	   philosophical	   dichotomies,	   Dewey	   also	   rejects	   the	  
nature/culture	  dichotomy	  by	  insisting	  on	  understanding	  humans	  as	  always	  within	  nature.	  It	  
follows	  that	  the	  technologies	  we	  design	  are	  also	  a	  part	  of	  nature,	  just	  like	  it	  is	  a	  part	  of	  nature	  
that	  moles	  build	  tunnels	  and	  molehills,	  and	  beavers	  construct	  dams.	  Another	  consequence	  is	  
that	   we	   do	   not	   have	   any	   ”pure	   sensations”	   that	   can	   then	   be	   corrupted	   by	   mediating	  
technologies,	   a	   point	   on	   which	   Dewey	   agreed	   with	   another	   prominent	   pragmatist	  
philosopher,	  William	  James	  (Hickman	  1990:32).	  Rather,	  our	  sensations	  are	  inevitably	  shaped	  
by	  the	  specific	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  world	  has	  developed	  before	  us,	  including	  the	  way	  language	  
has	   evolved	   and	   technologies	   and	   objects	   have	   been	   amassed.	   Dewey’s	   argument	   is	   thus	  
similar	   to	   Latour’s	   rejection	   of	   the	   idea	   that	   there	   exists	   a	   face-­‐to-­‐face	   gold	   standard	  when	  
evaluating	  human	  interaction.	  	  
	  
Having	   introduced	  Dewey	   as	   a	   thinker	  who	   rejects	   dichotomies	   like	   individual/society	   and	  
nature/culture,	   it	   is	   now	   possible	   to	   appreciate	   the	   central	   techno-­‐anthropological	   move	  
made	  by	  Dewey.	  According	  to	  him,	  humans	  cannot	  understand	  the	  world	  without	  technology.	  
This	  is	  part	  of	  Dewey’s	  ’anti-­‐foundationalism’,	  which	  involves	  a	  rejection	  of	  the	  idea,	  common	  
in	  mainstream	  science,	   that	  there	   is	  a	   fundamental	   frame	  of	  reference	  called	  nature,	   located	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somewhere	   outside	   human	   activity,	   and	   upon	  which	   scientific	   facts	   can	   be	   based.	  Hickman	  
explains	   well	   Dewey’s	   combination	   of	   such	   antifoundationalism	   with	   seeing	   experience	   as	  
always	  mediated:	  
	  
”Against	   [the]	   traditional	   philosophical	   views	   Dewey	   proposes	   a	   ”Copernican”	  
revolution.	  Its	  meaning	  would	  be	  that	  the	  world	  of	  our	  experience	  is	  a	  real	  world,	  
but	  a	  world	  that	  is	  in	  need	  of	  transformation	  in	  order	  to	  render	  it	  more	  coherent	  
and	  more	  secure.	  Knowing	  an	  experienced	  world	  is	  instrumental	  to	  rearranging	  
it	  and	  giving	   it	  a	   form	  that	   is	  more	  useful	   to	  our	  purposes.	  But	  knowing	   in	   this	  
sense	  is	  not	  something	  done	  apart	  from	  the	  world:	  it	  takes	  place	  experimentally	  
inside	   experienced	   situations.	   The	   difference	   between	   knowing	   and	   other	  
existential	   interaction	   is,	   in	   Dewey’s	   terms,	   not	   between	   something	   going	   on	  
within	  nature	  as	  a	  part	  of	  itself	  and	  something	  else	  taking	  place	  outside	  it,	  but	  is	  
that	   between	   a	   regulated	   course	   of	   changes	   and	   an	   uncontrolled	   one.	   In	  
knowledge,	  causes	  become	  means	  and	  effects	  become	  consequences,	  and	  thereby	  
things	  have	  meanings.”	  (Hickman	  1990:37-­‐38)	  
	  
	  
What	  Hickman	  gets	  at	  here	  is	  that	  for	  Dewey	  our	  very	  ability	  to	  navigate	  the	  world	  hinges	  on	  
our	  use	  of	  technology	  to	  simplify	  the	  world	  and	  make	  sense	  of	  it.	  Here,	  one	  might	  go	  back	  to	  
the	  example	  of	  the	  technology	  of	  walls	  and	  how	  they	  fend	  off	  the	  world	  in	  a	  way	  that	  frames	  
social	  interaction	  so	  that	  it	  may	  become	  possible	  to	  handle	  in	  practice.	  In	  order	  to	  capture	  this	  
central	   role	   of	   technology	   in	   human	   lives,	   Dewey	   makes	   the	   word	   ’technology’	   largely	  
synonymous	  with	   his	   key	   idea	   of	   ’inquiry’,	   or	   what	   Hickman	   calls	   ’knowing’,	   which	  means	  
identifying	  means	  and	  consequences,	  and	  thus	  making	  sense	  of	  our	  experiences.	  	  
	  
Another	  way	  to	  understand	  Dewey’s	  conceptualization	  of	  technology	  as	  inquiry	  is	  to	  recall	  the	  
definition	   of	   technology	   as	   ’the	   systematic	   treatment	   of	   craft’.	   With	   Dewey,	   the	   notion	   of	  
’systematic	   treatment’	   takes	   on	   new	   significance	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   technology	   comes	   to	   be	  
understood	  as	  the	  very	  ability	  of	  humans	  to	  treat	  the	  world	  systematically.	  The	  reason	  why	  all	  
anthropology	  should	  be	  called	  techno-­‐anthropology	  is	  that	  technology	  is	  the	  means	  by	  which	  
humans	  come	  to	  understand	  the	  world	   in	  terms	  of	  meaningful	  connections	  between	  actions	  
and	  consequences.	  As	   it	  may	  have	  already	  occurred	  to	  the	  reader,	  such	  an	  understanding	  of	  
technology	   is	   radical	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   it	   rejects	   any	   distinction	   between	   physical	   and	  
psychological	  technologies.	  Theories	  and	  concepts	  are	  also	  technologies	  in	  so	  far	  as	  they	  help	  
us	   make	   sense	   of	   the	   world.	   One	   might	   say	   that	   with	   Dewey,	   technology	   changes	   from	  
describing	   the	   part	   of	   the	   world	   made	   out	   of	   nuts	   and	   bolts	   to	   describing	   a	   sort	   of	  
’technological	  gaze’,	  fundamental	  to	  human	  existence,	  by	  means	  of	  which	  we	  make	  pragmatic	  
sense	  of	  the	  world	  in	  somewhat	  mechanical	  terms	  connecting	  actions	  with	  consequences.	  
	  
At	   the	   same	   time,	   Dewey’s	   radical	   reconceptualization	   of	   technology	   as	   inquiry	   should	  
certainly	   not	   be	   taken	   as	   an	   invitation	   to	   lose	   sight	   of	   technologies	   in	   the	   more	  
commonsensical	  meaning	   of	   the	   term.	   Dewey	   argued	   that	   technological	   change	  was	   key	   to	  
understanding	   other	   changes,	   such	   as	   political	   change.	   Crucially	   for	   Dewey,	   this	   does	   not	  
happen	  in	  a	  simple,	  deterministic	  way,	  but	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  technological	  development	  often	  
proves	   necessary	   for	   other	   kinds	   of	   development.	   In	   The	   Public	   and	   Its	   Problems,	   Dewey	  
explains	   the	   rise	   of	   democracy	   as	   closely	   associated	  with	   the	  many	   economic,	   political	   and	  
Birkbak, A. (2013). Why all anthropology should be called techno-anthropology: On the consequences of a 
pragmatist understanding of technology. In T. Børsen, & L. Botin (eds.), What is Techno-
Anthropology?. Aalborg: Aalborg Universitetsforlag. (Series in Transformational Studies; No. 1, Vol. 2). 
	  	  
	   8	  
philosophical	  changes	  during	  the	  industrialization.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  industrialization	  leads	  to	  
a	  proliferation	  of	   complex	   consequences	  of	   actions	   that	   can	  no	   longer	  be	   contained	   in	   local	  
communities,	   which	   again	   makes	   it	   difficult	   for	   publics	   to	   organize	   and	   keep	   democracy	  
working.	  This	  gives	  communication	  technologies	  a	  central	  role,	  according	  to	  Dewey:	  
	  
”Our	  modern	  state-­‐unity	   is	  due	  to	  the	  consequences	  of	  technology	  employed	  so	  
as	  to	  facilitate	  the	  rapid	  and	  easy	  circulation	  of	  opinions	  and	  information,	  and	  so	  
as	  to	  generate	  constant	  and	  intricate	  interaction	  far	  beyond	  the	  limits	  of	  face-­‐to-­‐
face	  communities”	  (Dewey	  1927:114)	  
	  
The	   interesting	   thing	  about	   this	   statement	   in	  comparison	  with	  more	  recent	  analysis	  of	  new	  
media	  technologies	  is	  that	  with	  Dewey’s	  understanding	  of	  technology,	  the	  introduction	  of	  new	  
media	  does	  not	  only	  change	  how	  we	  communicate	  about	  the	  world	  –	  it	  also	  changes	  the	  world	  
itself	  by	  changing	  how	  we	  make	  sense	  of	  it.	  This	  is	  why	  I	  find	  it	  interesting	  to	  also	  read	  Dewey	  
as	   a	   techno-­‐anthropologist.	   With	   his	   conceptualization	   of	   technology	   as	   inquiry,	   the	  
investigation	   of	   new	   technologies	   also	   becomes	   the	   investigation	   of	   new	   human	   worlds	   –	  
which	  is	  a	  pertinent	  and	  ambitious	  problem	  formulation	  for	  techno-­‐anthropology.	  In	  order	  to	  
make	   clearer	   what	   such	   a	   problem	   formulation	   might	   lead	   to,	   I	   end	   this	   chapter	   with	  
discussing	  the	  apparently	  very	  different	  empirical	  cases	  of	  stone	  axes	  and	  social	  media.	  
	  
Two	  empirical	  examples:	  From	  stone	  axes	  to	  social	  media	  
In	  a	  book	  (and	  radio	  program	  series)	  called	  A	  History	  of	  the	  World	  in	  100	  Objects,	  the	  director	  
of	   the	  British	  Museum,	  Neil	  MacGregor	   (2012),	  presents	  a	  view	  of	  humans	  as	   seen	   through	  
their	   objects.	   The	   second	   object	   presented	   in	   the	   book	   is	   one	   of	   the	   earliest	   objects	   ever	  
shaped	   by	   humans	   –	   a	   stone	   chopping	   tool	   –	   which	   serves	   as	   a	   surprisingly	   illustrative	  
example	  of	  the	  arguments	  put	  forward	  by	  Latour	  and	  Dewey.	  As	  MacGregor	  writes:	  
	  
”Lots	  of	  animals,	  particularly	  apes,	  use	  objects;	  but	  what	  sets	  us	  apart	  from	  them	  
is	  that	  we	  make	  tools	  before	  we	  need	  them,	  and	  once	  we	  have	  used	  them	  we	  keep	  
them	  to	  use	  again.”	  (MacGregor	  2012:10)	  
	  
According	   to	   MacGregor,	   the	   stone-­‐chopping	   tool	   is	   remarkable,	   because	   it	   marks	   the	  
beginning	  of	   ”an	   impulse	  not	   just	   to	  make	  things	  but	   to	   imagine	  how	  we	  could	  make	  things	  
’better’”	   (ibid.:11).	   The	   archeological	   inquiry	   that	   MacGregor	   describes	   proposes	   that	   the	  
particular	  modified	  stone	  under	  discussion	  is	  1.8-­‐2	  million	  years	  old.	  In	  a	  very	  concrete	  way,	  
the	   story	   of	   the	   earliest	  man-­‐shaped	   tools	   is	   the	   story	   of	   the	   beginning	   of	   our	   existence	   as	  
human	  beings:	  
	  
”…the	  chopping	  tool	  is	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  relationship	  between	  humans	  and	  the	  
things	  they	  create	  which	  is	  both	  a	  love	  affair	  and	  a	  dependency.	  From	  the	  point	  
where	  our	  ancestors	  started	  making	   tools	   like	   this,	  people	  have	  been	  unable	   to	  
survive	  without	  the	  things	  they	  make;	  in	  this	  sense,	  it	  is	  making	  things	  that	  make	  
us	  human”	  (ibid.:11)	  
	  
There	  is	  not	  a	  long	  way	  from	  this	  argument	  to	  Latour’s	  definition	  of	  humans	  as	  those	  animals	  
who	   surround	   themselves	   with	   technologies.	   With	   reference	   to	   the	   objects	   found	   in	   the	  
British	  Museum,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	  we	   do	   not	   need	   Latour	   to	   arrive	   at	   the	   conclusion	   that	   all	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anthropology	   should	   be	   called	   techno-­‐anthropology	   –	   yet	   his	   texts	   can	   serve	   as	   a	   guide	   on	  
how	  to	  study	  contemporary	  phenomena	  such	  as	  doors	  and	  social	  media	  without	   falling	   into	  
the	  traps	  of	  seeing	  a	  door	  as	  a	  non-­‐moral	  ’part	  of	  nature’	  or	  seeing	  social	  media	  as	  obscuring	  a	  
’more	  human’	  mode	  of	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  communication.	  	  
	  
But	   what	   about	   Dewey’s	   perhaps	   less	   accessible	   notion	   of	   technology	   as	   inquiry?	   For	  
illustrating	  this	  argument,	  better	  tools	  are	  needed,	  such	  as	  the	  improved	  stone	  hand	  axe	  that	  
MacGregor	   describes	   as	   the	   third	   object	   of	   his	   book.	   The	   hand	   axe	   is	   found	   in	   the	   same	  
Oldupai	  Gorge	   in	  Tanzania	  as	  the	  stone-­‐chopping	  tool,	  but	  was	  made	  almost	  1	  million	  years	  
later.	  Carefully	  making	  a	  hand	  axe	  requires	  real	  imagination	  –	  the	  ability	  to	  see	  tool-­‐potential	  
in	  a	  stone	  and	  learn	  the	  craft	  of	  realizing	  it.	  As	  MacGregor	  (2012:14)	  puts	  it:	  ”It’s	  here	  we	  find	  
the	   real	  beginnings	  of	  modern	  humans”.	  How	  does	   this	  make	  sense?	  Or	   to	  ask	  with	  Dewey,	  
how	  did	  the	  construction	  of	  hand	  axes	  change	  the	  human	  world?	  MacGregor	  continues:	  
	  
”All	   the	   carefully	   focused	   and	   planned	   creativity	   required	   to	   make	   this	   axe	  
implies	  an	  enormous	  advance	  in	  how	  our	  ancestors	  saw	  the	  world	  and	  how	  their	  
brains	  worked.	  The	  hand	  axe	  may	  also	  contain	   the	  evidence	  of	   something	  even	  
more	  remarkable:	  this	  chipped	  stone	  tool	  may	  hold	  the	  secret	  of	  speech,	   it	  may	  
have	  been	  in	  making	  things	  like	  this	  that	  we	  learnt	  how	  to	  talk	  to	  one	  another	  (…)	  
Surprisingly,	   the	  areas	  of	   the	  modern	  brain	   that	  you	  use	  when	  you’re	  making	  a	  
hand	  axe	  overlap	  considerably	  with	  those	  you	  use	  when	  you	  speak.	  It	  now	  seems	  
very	  likely	  that	  if	  you	  can	  shape	  a	  stone	  you	  can	  shape	  a	  sentence.”	  (MacGregor	  
2012:14-­‐15)	  
	  
Following	   Dewey,	   the	   association	   of	   hand	   axes	   with	   speech	   in	   fact	   does	   not	   seem	   that	  
incredible.	   Sidestepping	   a	   definition	   of	   technology	   that	   distinguishes	   strictly	   between	   the	  
physical	   and	   the	   psychological,	   it	   makes	   sense	   that	   the	   technology	   of	   a	   hand	   axe	   implied	  
another	  technology,	  namely	  speech.	  As	  argued	  above,	  a	  hand	  axe	  could	  not	  be	  crafted	  without	  
a	  well-­‐developed	  imagination	  of	  potential	  over	  time:	  Transforming	  a	  rock	  into	  a	  tool	  required	  
both	  patience	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  learn	  and	  improve	  the	  techniques	  of	  one’s	  ancestors.	  Such	  a	  
sense	   of	   time	   is	   likely	   to	   have	   made	   it	   correspondingly	   more	   important	   to	   make	   detailed	  
arrangements	   and	   plans	   for	   the	   future	   through	   language.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   way	   we	   as	  
humans	  give	  meaning	  to	  the	  world	  and	  appreciate	  that	  our	  actions	  have	  consequences	  over	  
time	  is	  fundamentally	  a	  part	  of	  our	  use	  of	  technology,	  and	  something	  as	  ’human’	  as	  language	  
may	   very	   well	   have	   developed	   in	   association	  with	   something	   as	   ’technological’	   as	   chipped	  
stone	  axes.	  Archaeological	  evidence	   indicates	  that	  we	  were	  techno-­‐anthropological	   from	  the	  
very	   beginning,	   as	  Dewey	   and	   Latour	  would	   have	   it	   (however,	   both	  Birkholm,	   this	   volume,	  
and	  Jensen,	  this	  volume,	  argue	  that	  the	  ‘techno’	  prefix	  has	  increased	  in	  importance	  over	  time).	  
	  
One	   thing	   is	   stone	   axes,	   then,	   but	   what	   about	   something	   slightly	   more	   relevant	   to	  
contemporary	   life?	   How	   might	   techno-­‐anthropology	   contribute	   and	   make	   itself	   relevant	  
today?	   The	   second	   part	   of	   Turkle’s	   argument	   in	   Alone	   Together	   concerns	   new	   media	  
technologies.	  Her	  argument	   is	   that	   there	   is	  a	   tragic	   irony	  to	   the	   fact	   that	  we	  are	   ’always	  on’	  
through	  our	  smartphones	  and	  wireless	  Internet,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  more	  alone	  than	  before.	  
One	  of	  her	  more	  pertinent	  examples	  is	  that	  of	  the	  ”postfamilial	  family”	  (quoting	  Wellman	  and	  
Hogan	  2006),	  whose	  members	   live	   in	   the	   same	  house,	   but	   live	   separate	   lives	   through	   their	  
individual	  devices	  with	  Internet-­‐access.	  An	  important	  source	  of	  power	  for	  Turkle’s	  argument,	  
Birkbak, A. (2013). Why all anthropology should be called techno-anthropology: On the consequences of a 
pragmatist understanding of technology. In T. Børsen, & L. Botin (eds.), What is Techno-
Anthropology?. Aalborg: Aalborg Universitetsforlag. (Series in Transformational Studies; No. 1, Vol. 2). 
	  	  
	   10	  
however,	   seems	   to	   be	   that	   this	   connected	   lifestyle	   is	   something	   radically	   new,	   something	  
’other’	  that	  we	  do	  not	  yet	  know	  how	  to	  deal	  with.	  In	  the	  conclusion,	  she	  says:	  ”The	  networked	  
culture	   is	   very	   young”	   (Turkle	   2011:294).	   But	   in	   light	   of	   the	   preceding	   arguments	   in	   this	  
chapter,	  we,	  as	  techno-­‐anthropologists,	  might	  be	  well	  equipped	  to	  ask:	  Is	  that	  true?	  Have	  we	  
not	  always	  been	  networked	  in	  some	  sense?	  And	  is	  it	  really	  a	  new	  thing	  that	  our	  relationships	  
are	   mediated	   by	   technology?	   Is	   there	   such	   a	   great	   difference	   between	   simplifying	   human	  
interaction	  by	  means	  of	  walls	  and	  doors	  vis-­‐a-­‐vis	  using	  social	  media	  that	  one	  can	  log	  on	  and	  
off?	  
	  
In	  my	  own	  attempts	  at	  techno-­‐anthropological	  research,	   I	  am	  looking	  at	  how	  we	  sometimes	  
use	  social	  media	  in	  reaction	  to	   infrastructural	   innovations	  that	   influence	  our	  everyday	  lives.	  
In	  a	  sense,	  this	  is	  very	  much	  about	  politics:	  What	  is	  the	  relationship	  between	  people	  and	  the	  
technological	  systems	  that	  influence	  their	  lives?	  The	  interesting	  feature	  of	  social	  media	  is	  that	  
through	  these	  technologies,	  people	  can	  connect	  with	  other	  people	  and	  share	  their	  experiences	  
in	   ways	   that	   make	   them	   more	   meaningful	   (see	   also	   Munk,	   this	   volume,	   on	   techno-­‐
anthropological	   studies	   of	   the	  web).	   For	   example,	   I	   studied	   how	   inhabitants	   of	   the	   Danish	  
island	  of	  Bornholm	  used	  Facebook	  groups	  to	  share	  their	  experiences	  of	  the	  severe	  snowstorm	  
that	  made	   it	  very	  difficult	   to	  get	  anywhere	  during	  Christmas	  2010	  (Birkbak	  2012,	  2013).	   In	  
these	  groups,	  users	  found	  confirmation	  that	  they	  were	  not	  alone	  in	  the	  way	  they	  understood	  
the	  situation,	  and	  for	  some	  this	  was	  a	  deeply	  comforting	  experience.	  This	  finding	  echoes	  those	  
of	  Bakardjieva	  (2012),	  who	  argues	  that	  the	  Internet	  amplifies	  the	  everyday	  life	  component	  of	  
democratic	   politics	   she	   calls	   ’subactivism’.	   On	   the	   level	   of	   subactivism,	   people	   create	   and	  
refine	   ’we-­‐identities’	   based	   on	   their	   everyday	   lives,	   most	   of	   which	   are	   not	   political	   in	   any	  
traditional	  sense,	  but	  certainly	  has	  political	  potential,	  as	  when	  the	  members	  of	  one	  Facebook	  
group	   on	   Bornholm	   agreed	   to	   try	   and	   lobby	   the	   national	   news	   media	   in	   order	   to	   draw	  
attention	  to	  their	  needs,	  which	  they	  felt	  were	  being	  overlooked	  by	  the	  local	  authorities.	  
	  
While	   the	   opportunities	   that	   social	   media	   technologies	   offer	   for	   sharing	   experiences	   and	  
organize	   around	  otherwise	   overlooked	   issues	   are	   both	  new	  and	   fascinating,	   there	   is	   a	   long	  
way	   from	   there	   to	   Turkle’s	   conclusion	   that	   human	   relationships	   beyond	   face-­‐to-­‐face	  
interaction	   is	   something	   that	   challenges	   our	   very	   humanity,	   or	   the	   conclusion	   that	   human	  
relationships	   are	   now	   more	   mediated	   than	   before.	   Drawing	   on	   Dewey,	   we	   have	   always	  
required	   technologies	   to	   perform	   collective	   inquiry.	   Before	   social	   media,	   printed	   media	  
played	  a	  similar	  role	  of	  circulating	  experiences	  across	  space	  and	  time.	  Before	  printed	  media,	  
spoken	   language	  mediated	  our	   relationships,	  making	   it	  possible	   to	   coordinate	  action	  across	  
space	  and	  time.	  As	  suggested	  by	  MacGregor,	  language	  is	  not	  some	  inherent	  ability	  of	  humans,	  
but	  a	  technology	  that	  we	  make	  use	  of,	  and	  one	  that	  is	  most	  likely	  connected	  to	  our	  use	  of	  other	  
technologies,	  such	  as	  the	  stone	  axe,	  the	  powers	  of	  which	  made	  it	  urgent	  to	  coordinate	  action	  
through	  language.	  	  
	  
When	  read	  through	  the	  techno-­‐anthropological	  gaze	  proposed	  in	  this	  chapter,	  the	  subtitle	  of	  
Turkle’s	  book	  thus	  takes	  on	  new	  meaning:	  Perhaps	   it	  was	  always	  the	  point	   to	  ”expect	  more	  
from	  technology	  and	  less	  from	  each	  other”?	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